---
id: scf.vulnerability-management
title: "Vulnerability management"
kind: standard-part
standard: scf
part: method
domain: operations
description: "The method for the vulnerability-handling rules of the System Construction Framework (SCF) as rules with identifiers: intake, triage, remediation and closure, coordinated disclosure, regulatory reporting duties, and the records that show each was done, each with its check."
version: 0.1.0
status: draft
related: [scf.constitution, scf.evaluation, scf.glossary, scf.update-and-lifecycle, scf.references, scf.change-policy]
last_reviewed: 2026-11-21
review_every: 12
tableOfContents:
  maxHeadingLevel: 4
sidebar:
  order: 16
---

## Summary

Version: **0.1**

Method for `SCF-VUL`. The [Construction Constitution](/scf/constitution/) states what must hold: a published
contact, a defined process, a release without known-exploited vulnerabilities, advisories with fixes, a reporting
capability and a disclosure policy. This part states how the steps of that process are carried out and how each is
checked: what an intake record holds, how affected releases are found, how a scanner finding is classified, how a fix is
verified, what a disclosure policy covers, when the clock of a reporting duty starts, and how long the records of
all of it are kept.

Every rule here is identified `SCF-VMG-NNN` and carries a rationale, a source, the systems it applies to and its
verification. The part is new in 0.1 and carries no text over from an earlier document, so every rule is a
recommendation: a new obligation enters at that level and can become a requirement only in a MAJOR release
([Change policy](/scf/change-policy/), `SCF-CHG-004` and `SCF-CHG-005`). Where a Constitution rule or a rule of
[Update and lifecycle](/scf/update-and-lifecycle/) already states an obligation, this part does not repeat it: it
points to the rule, which remains the one home.

The rules of this part bind the **producer of a product**. They set no response time and no threshold: the times are
those of the severity scale (`SCF-ULC-030`) and of the disclosure policy (`SCF-VUL-007`) that the producer
publishes, and the check of each rule compares the records with what the producer stated. The regulations that
impose reporting deadlines, with the dates from which they apply, are in [References](/scf/references/); the rules
here name no jurisdiction. Terms are defined in the [glossary](/scf/glossary/).

## Rules

### 1. Intake — `SCF-VMG`

#### SCF-VMG-001. Reporting contact in a machine-readable file

The producer SHOULD publish its reporting contact as a `security.txt` file under the well-known path of the domain of
its delivery surface, in the form of RFC 9116, with a `Contact` field and an `Expires` field that has not passed.

- **Rationale.** A contact that a researcher finds only by reading prose is found late or not at all; a file at a
  fixed address is found by a tool, and an expired one shows that nobody maintains it.
- **Source.** RFC 9116, sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.5 (the `Contact` and `Expires` fields "MUST always be present") and
  section 3 (the file is placed under `/.well-known/`), accessed 2026-11-21. RFC 9116 defines the file; it does not
  ask a producer to publish one. The SHOULD is the Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md`
  §4.2 wave W7, decision D1 of 2026-11-21).
- **Applies.** Every producer that has a delivery surface on the web.
- **Verification.** E2 — fetch the file from the domain of the delivery surface and parse it. Checks: SCF-CHK-491.

#### SCF-VMG-002. Every report logged on receipt

The producer SHOULD log every vulnerability report on receipt, accepted or not, with the time of receipt, the
channel, the disclosure preference the reporter stated and the person who received it, and record the reason for a
report it does not accept.

- **Rationale.** A report logged only when accepted leaves no trace of what was dismissed and no moment from which
  response times and reporting deadlines can be counted.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with
  Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 13(7) (manufacturers "systematically document ... relevant cybersecurity aspects
  concerning the products with digital elements, including vulnerabilities of which they become aware and any
  relevant information provided by third parties"), accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 13(7) asks for documentation in a
  manner proportionate to the risks; it does not ask for a log of every report with these items. The SHOULD and the
  items are the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- **Verification.** E2 — send test reports through the published channel and compare the log with what the channel
  received. Checks: SCF-CHK-492.

#### SCF-VMG-003. Reporter told of every change of status

The producer SHOULD send the reporter a message at each change of status of the report, the last at closure and
stating the outcome, until the defect record is closed.

- **Rationale.** A reporter who hears nothing after the acknowledgement assumes the report was ignored, and may
  disclose it elsewhere.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with
  ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1, provision 5.2-1 (a published policy with timelines for "initial acknowledgement of
  receipt" and "status updates until the resolution of the reported issues"), and the Product Security and
  Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023,
  Schedule 1 paragraph 2(2)(b); both accessed 2026-11-21. Both ask the producer to publish when the reporter will
  receive an acknowledgement and status updates; neither asks for a message at every change of status. The SHOULD is
  the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- **Verification.** E2 — follow a test report through every change of status and read what the reporter was sent.
  Checks: SCF-CHK-493.

### 2. Triage — `SCF-VMG`

#### SCF-VMG-004. Affected releases from the bills of materials

For each accepted vulnerability in a component, the producer SHOULD determine the affected releases, channels and
architectures by querying the bills of materials of every release in support, and record the result in the defect
record.

- **Rationale.** A producer that answers "which of my releases ship this component?" from memory misses a release
  that ships it, or patches one that does not.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with
  Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Annex I Part II point (1) (manufacturers "identify and document vulnerabilities and
  components contained in products with digital elements, including by drawing up a software bill of materials"),
  accessed 2026-11-21. Point (1) asks to identify and document components and vulnerabilities; it does not ask that
  the affected releases be found by querying the bills of materials of every release in support. The SHOULD is the
  Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- **Verification.** E2 — state a vulnerable range for a component whose version differs between two releases in
  support and compare the producer's list with a query of the bills of materials. Checks: SCF-CHK-494.

#### SCF-VMG-005. Status of a scanner finding, with a justification

The producer SHOULD classify each scanner finding for the delivered configuration with one of the status labels of
`SCF-VUL-004` (`not_affected`, `affected`, `fixed` or `under_investigation`) and give each `not_affected` a
justification.

- **Rationale.** A scanner finding dismissed without a reason cannot be reviewed, and the published statement of
  `SCF-VUL-004` has nothing to publish.
- **Source.** OpenVEX specification v0.2.0 (the four status labels; "a VEX statement MUST include either a status
  justification or an impact_statement" for `not_affected`), accessed 2026-11-21. The specification states this for
  the statements it defines; it does not ask for it in the producer's own triage record. The SHOULD is the Decision,
  owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7).
- **Applies.** Every producer that triages scanner findings or vulnerability reports.
- **Verification.** E1 — read the triage record of a sample of scanner findings for a label each and a justification
  for every `not_affected`. Checks: SCF-CHK-495.

#### SCF-VMG-006. Severity for the delivered configuration

The producer SHOULD record, for each accepted vulnerability, the rating given by the upstream or the public
vulnerability database, the severity it assigns on its published scale (`SCF-ULC-030`) and the reason for the
severity chosen.

- **Rationale.** A score copied from a database says how bad a flaw is in the worst environment; the severity the
  producer assigns says what it will do in this product, and a reviewer needs both to see the difference.
- **Source.** FIRST, Common Vulnerability Scoring System v4.0, specification document 1.2 (the Base score "assumes the
  reasonable worst-case impact across different deployed environments"; the Environmental metrics "further refine"
  it "to a specific computing environment", and assessing them "is not required, but is highly recommended"),
  accessed 2026-11-21. The specification
  defines scores and says who assesses which metric group; it does not ask a producer to record a rating, a severity
  and a reason together. The SHOULD is the Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2
  wave W7).
- **Applies.** Every producer that publishes security advisories.
- **Verification.** E1 — read the defect record of each security advisory in a sample for the three items. Checks:
  SCF-CHK-496.

#### SCF-VMG-007. Releases in support matched against vulnerability data

The producer SHOULD match the bill of materials of every release in support against current vulnerability data on a
schedule it states, and record the date, the version of the data and the result of each run.

- **Rationale.** The release block of `SCF-VUL-003` looks at a release once; vulnerabilities are published after the
  release, so without a recurring match a release in support is silent exactly when it is exposed.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with NIST
  SP 800-218 RV.1.1 ("Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential
  vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses", example 1: "Monitor
  vulnerability databases"), accessed 2026-11-21. RV.1.1 asks to gather such information; it names no schedule and
  no record of each run. The schedule and the record are the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer with a release in support.
- **Verification.** E2 — read the schedule and the run records, then run the matching on a copy of a bill of
  materials that holds a component with a published vulnerability. Checks: SCF-CHK-497.

### 3. Remediation and closure — `SCF-VMG`

#### SCF-VMG-008. One recorded outcome for each release

Each accepted vulnerability SHOULD end, for every release in support, in exactly one recorded outcome — fixed,
mitigated, not affected, accepted as residual risk (`SCF-VUL-009`) or not fixed because the release or the component
is out of support — with a date and the person who decided.

- **Rationale.** A defect record closed as "done" leaves it unclear which releases received a fix and which were
  left; each release needs its own answer.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with NIST
  SP 800-218 RV.2.2 ("Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities", example 1: a "risk-based decision as to
  whether each vulnerability will be remediated or if the risk will be addressed through other means (e.g., risk
  acceptance, risk transference)"), accessed 2026-11-21. RV.2.2 asks for a risk response for each
  vulnerability; it does not ask for one outcome per release in support, a date and a decider. Those are the
  Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- **Verification.** E1 — read a sample of closed defect records against the releases in support at closure. Checks:
  SCF-CHK-498.

#### SCF-VMG-009. Fix verified by reproduction before and after

The producer SHOULD verify a fix by reproducing the vulnerability on the build without the fix and then on the build
with it, and record both results.

- **Rationale.** A fix verified only by the absence of a symptom may remove the symptom and leave the vulnerability;
  a reproduction that fails on the build without the fix shows that the test can fail.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). No source consulted
  states this method; it is the practice of a regression test that fails before the fix and passes after it.
- **Applies.** Every producer that fixes a vulnerability by a change to code or configuration.
- **Verification.** E2 — repeat the recorded reproduction on both builds for the last fixes. Checks: SCF-CHK-499.

#### SCF-VMG-010. Root cause and recurrence recorded

After a fix, the producer SHOULD record the root cause of the vulnerability, the result of a search for the same
weakness elsewhere in the system, and the change made to its process or the reason that none is needed.

- **Rationale.** A vulnerability fixed without asking why it was possible is fixed once, and its siblings wait to be
  reported.
- **Source.** NIST SP 800-218 RV.3.1 ("Analyze identified vulnerabilities to determine their root causes"), RV.3.3
  ("Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities") and RV.3.4 ("Review the
  SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring"),
  accessed 2026-11-21. The three practices state the three items; the SSDF is a set of recommendations, which is the
  level taken here.
- **Applies.** Every producer that fixes an accepted vulnerability.
- **Verification.** E1 — read the records of the last fixed vulnerabilities for the three items. Checks: SCF-CHK-500.

### 4. Coordinated disclosure — `SCF-VMG`

#### SCF-VMG-011. Contents of the disclosure policy

The disclosure policy (`SCF-VUL-007`) SHOULD also state its scope (which releases and components), the longest
period for which publication may be deferred at the request of the reporter or an affected party, how reporters are
credited and how the producer treats good-faith research.

- **Rationale.** A reporter who does not know what is in scope, how long silence can last, whether they will be named
  and whether testing is welcome will report elsewhere or not at all.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with ETSI
  EN 303 645 V2.1.1, provision 5.2-1 (a policy with contact information and timelines), and the Linux kernel
  documentation, "Security bugs" ("postponed at the request of the reporter or an affected party for up to 7
  calendar days from the start of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days"); both
  accessed 2026-11-21. They show items a policy states; neither lists these four. The SHOULD and the four items are
  the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer.
- **Verification.** E1 — read the published policy for the four items. Checks: SCF-CHK-501.

#### SCF-VMG-012. Derivatives told before publication

Where other products derive from the product, the producer SHOULD notify the producers of the known derivatives of a
vulnerability that is under embargo before it publishes the advisory, through a channel its disclosure policy names.

- **Rationale.** A derivative that learns of a flaw from the advisory has no time to prepare its own fix; one that is
  told first can publish its advisory together with the producer's.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). The Linux kernel
  documentation, "Security bugs", section "Coordination with other groups", accessed 2026-11-21, describes the
  channels through which one upstream's fixes reach operating system vendors; it does not ask a producer to notify
  derivatives. The SHOULD is the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer that knows of a derivative of its product.
- **Verification.** E2 — compare the time of notification of each known derivative with the time of publication for
  the last embargoed vulnerability, or send a test notice. Checks: SCF-CHK-502.

#### SCF-VMG-013. A delay in publishing details has a reason and an end date

The producer SHOULD record the reason and the end date of any delay in publishing the details of a fixed
vulnerability.

- **Rationale.** Withholding details until recipients can apply the update is sometimes right; unrecorded, it becomes
  indefinite concealment.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with
  Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Annex I Part II point (4) ("in duly justified cases, where manufacturers consider the
  security risks of publication to outweigh the security benefits, they may delay making public information regarding
  a fixed vulnerability until after users have been given the possibility to apply the relevant patch"), accessed
  2026-11-21. Point (4) allows the delay in justified cases; it does not ask for a recorded reason and end date. The
  SHOULD is the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer that delays the publication of details of a fixed vulnerability.
- **Verification.** E1 — compare the advisories that say details are withheld with the delay records. Checks:
  SCF-CHK-503.

### 5. Reporting duties — `SCF-VMG`

#### SCF-VMG-014. Moment of awareness defined and recorded

Each reporting case SHOULD carry the moment at which the producer became aware, established by an event that the
reporting procedure defines.

- **Rationale.** A deadline of hours counts from a moment; where nobody has said what that moment is, it is chosen
  afterwards, in the producer's favour.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with
  Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 14(2) and (4) (each deadline runs from the manufacturer "becoming aware"), accessed
  2026-11-21. Art. 14 does not say how awareness is established; defining the event and recording the moment is the
  Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer to whom regulation imposes reporting deadlines (`SCF-VUL-006`).
- **Verification.** E1 — compare the recorded moment of each case with the earliest log or ticket entry that shows
  the defining event. Checks: SCF-CHK-504.

#### SCF-VMG-015. Reportability decided and recorded for each case

For each accepted vulnerability and each security incident, a named role SHOULD record whether a reporting duty
applies, on what ground and at what time.

- **Rationale.** Without the decision record, a notice that was not sent cannot be told from one that was forgotten.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with
  Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 14(1), (3) and (5) (the triggers: an actively exploited vulnerability; a severe
  incident, with its criteria), accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 14 defines the triggers; it does not ask for a record of
  the decision that tests them. The SHOULD is the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer to whom regulation imposes reporting deadlines (`SCF-VUL-006`).
- **Verification.** E1 — read a sample of case records and every known-exploited vulnerability of the last year for
  the decision, the ground, the role and the time. Checks: SCF-CHK-505.

#### SCF-VMG-016. Advisory for an exploited vulnerability without a fix

When a vulnerability in a delivered component is known to be actively exploited and no fix exists, the producer
SHOULD publish an advisory that tells recipients what is affected and what they can do, without waiting for the fix.

- **Rationale.** Recipients who are not told cannot reduce their exposure during the days before a fix, by disabling
  a feature or restricting a network path.
- **Source.** Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 14(8) (after becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability the
  manufacturer informs impacted users "of any risk mitigation and corrective measures that the users can deploy"),
  accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 14(8) binds the manufacturers it covers; the SHOULD for every producer, in the form of an
  advisory before a fix exists, is the Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2
  wave W7).
- **Applies.** Every producer, when a vulnerability in a delivered component is known to be actively exploited and
  has no fix.
- **Verification.** E3 — rehearse the case and observe the advisory channel. Checks: SCF-CHK-506.

#### SCF-VMG-017. Rehearsal at a stated interval and after each change

The reporting capability of `SCF-VUL-006` SHOULD be rehearsed at an interval the reporting procedure states, and
again after each change of the reporting endpoint, the duty roster or a template.

- **Rationale.** A rehearsal shows that the procedure worked on that day; a change of endpoint, roster or template
  can break it unnoticed.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). `SCF-VUL-006`
  requires a rehearsed procedure and states no interval; no source consulted states one.
- **Applies.** Every producer to whom regulation imposes reporting deadlines (`SCF-VUL-006`).
- **Verification.** E1 — compare the date of the last rehearsal with the stated interval and with the latest change.
  Checks: SCF-CHK-507.

### 6. Records and measures — `SCF-VMG`

#### SCF-VMG-018. Handling records kept as long as the release record

The producer SHOULD retain the records of vulnerability handling — the report log, the defect records, the triage and
reportability decisions, the notices sent and the advisories — for at least as long as it retains the release record
(`SCF-EVD-006`).

- **Rationale.** Records kept for less time than the release they concern cannot answer a question about that
  release when a recipient or an authority asks it.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). Consistent with
  Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 13(7) and (13) (documentation of vulnerabilities; the technical documentation kept
  "for at least 10 years after the product ... has been placed on the market or for the support period, whichever is
  longer"), accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 13(13) names the technical documentation and the declaration of conformity, not
  the records of handling; the SHOULD for these records is the Decision.
- **Applies.** Every producer that keeps release records.
- **Verification.** E2 — retrieve the five kinds of record for the oldest release in support and compare the
  retention periods. Checks: SCF-CHK-508.

#### SCF-VMG-019. Handling times computed from the records

For each severity of its scale, the producer SHOULD compute from the records the time from receipt to
acknowledgement, to the triage decision and to the fix, and compare them with the times the scale states
(`SCF-ULC-030`).

- **Rationale.** A scale that states times is a promise; only a computation from the records shows whether it is
  kept.
- **Source.** Decision, owner Product Owner (plan `project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md` §4.2 wave W7). A computed time is a
  Measured claim of the [knowledge base](/scf/knowledge-base/) §4: the method is this computation, the data are the
  records and the date is the date of the computation.
- **Applies.** Every producer that publishes a severity scale with times.
- **Verification.** E2 — recompute the times for the vulnerabilities of the last year and compare them with the
  producer's computation and the scale. Checks: SCF-CHK-509.

## Guidance

### Stages and homes

The table says where each stage of the process of `SCF-VUL-002` has its obligation, its records and its method. It
adds no rule.

| Stage | Obligation | Records, severity and advisories | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intake | `SCF-VUL-001`, `SCF-VUL-002` | `SCF-ULC-027` to `SCF-ULC-029` | `SCF-VMG-001` to `SCF-VMG-003` |
| Triage and severity | `SCF-VUL-002`, `SCF-VUL-003`, `SCF-VUL-004`, `SCF-VUL-008` | `SCF-ULC-030`, `SCF-ULC-031` | `SCF-VMG-004` to `SCF-VMG-007` |
| Remediation and verification | `SCF-VUL-002`, `SCF-VUL-009`, `SCF-SRC-007` | `SCF-ULC-027` | `SCF-VMG-008` to `SCF-VMG-010` |
| Disclosure and advisories | `SCF-VUL-005`, `SCF-VUL-007` | `SCF-ULC-024` to `SCF-ULC-026`, `SCF-ULC-032` | `SCF-VMG-011` to `SCF-VMG-013` |
| Reporting duties | `SCF-VUL-006`, `SCF-LGL-006`, `SCF-GOV-008` | none | `SCF-VMG-014` to `SCF-VMG-017` |
| Records and measures | `SCF-EVD-006`, `SCF-LCM-003` | `SCF-ULC-030` | `SCF-VMG-018`, `SCF-VMG-019` |

### Where the checks are

The baseline checks of [Evaluation and conformance](/scf/evaluation/) section 3 verify the Constitution rules this
method carries out: `SCF-CHK-135` and `SCF-CHK-136` for the contact, the policy and the process, `SCF-CHK-137` for
advisories, `SCF-CHK-138` for the reporting capability, `SCF-CHK-041` and `SCF-CHK-042` for known-exploited
vulnerabilities and exploitability statements, and `SCF-CHK-448` and `SCF-CHK-476` for residual risk. Each rule of
this part has its own check in the same section of Evaluation, under the heading "Vulnerability management", named in
its verification field with the evidence level at which it shows the property. Two checks reuse an exercise of the
baseline: the rehearsal of `SCF-CHK-138` is the setting of `SCF-CHK-506`, and the test report of `SCF-CHK-136` can
serve `SCF-CHK-493`.

### Regulatory dates

The reporting deadlines, the support-period duties and the retention periods of the regulations that the rules of
this part serve are in [References](/scf/references/), each with the provision and the date from which it applies.
They are read again before related work and at least annually (`SCF-CHG-017`). A rule of this part does not change
when a date does.

## Sources

- [RFC 9116, A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure (April 2022)](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9116)
- [OpenVEX specification v0.2.0](https://github.com/openvex/spec/blob/main/OPENVEX-SPEC.md)
- [FIRST, Common Vulnerability Scoring System v4.0, specification document 1.2](https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document)
- [NIST SP 800-218, Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1 (February 2022)](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final)
- [ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06), Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/303600_303699/303645/02.01.01_60/en_303645v020101p.pdf)
- [The Linux kernel documentation, Security bugs](https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html)
