Vulnerability management
- Status
- Draft
- Version
- 0.1.0
- Authority
- UASK standard
- Applies to
- operating-system
Summary
Version: 0.1
Method for SCF-VUL. The Construction Constitution states what must hold: a published
contact, a defined process, a release without known-exploited vulnerabilities, advisories with fixes, a reporting
capability and a disclosure policy. This part states how the steps of that process are carried out and how each is
checked: what an intake record holds, how affected releases are found, how a scanner finding is classified, how a fix is
verified, what a disclosure policy covers, when the clock of a reporting duty starts, and how long the records of
all of it are kept.
Every rule here is identified SCF-VMG-NNN and carries a rationale, a source, the systems it applies to and its
verification. The part is new in 0.1 and carries no text over from an earlier document, so every rule is a
recommendation: a new obligation enters at that level and can become a requirement only in a MAJOR release
(Change policy, SCF-CHG-004 and SCF-CHG-005). Where a Constitution rule or a rule of
Update and lifecycle already states an obligation, this part does not repeat it: it
points to the rule, which remains the one home.
The rules of this part bind the producer of a product. They set no response time and no threshold: the times are
those of the severity scale (SCF-ULC-030) and of the disclosure policy (SCF-VUL-007) that the producer
publishes, and the check of each rule compares the records with what the producer stated. The regulations that
impose reporting deadlines, with the dates from which they apply, are in References; the rules
here name no jurisdiction. Terms are defined in the glossary.
Rules
1. Intake — SCF-VMG
SCF-VMG-001. Reporting contact in a machine-readable file
The producer SHOULD publish its reporting contact as a security.txt file under the well-known path of the domain of
its delivery surface, in the form of RFC 9116, with a Contact field and an Expires field that has not passed.
- Rationale. A contact that a researcher finds only by reading prose is found late or not at all; a file at a fixed address is found by a tool, and an expired one shows that nobody maintains it.
- Source. RFC 9116, sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.5 (the
ContactandExpiresfields “MUST always be present”) and section 3 (the file is placed under/.well-known/), accessed 2026-11-21. RFC 9116 defines the file; it does not ask a producer to publish one. The SHOULD is the Decision, owner Product Owner (planproject/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7, decision D1 of 2026-11-21). - Applies. Every producer that has a delivery surface on the web.
- Verification. E2 — fetch the file from the domain of the delivery surface and parse it. Checks: SCF-CHK-491.
SCF-VMG-002. Every report logged on receipt
The producer SHOULD log every vulnerability report on receipt, accepted or not, with the time of receipt, the channel, the disclosure preference the reporter stated and the person who received it, and record the reason for a report it does not accept.
- Rationale. A report logged only when accepted leaves no trace of what was dismissed and no moment from which response times and reporting deadlines can be counted.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 13(7) (manufacturers “systematically document … relevant cybersecurity aspects concerning the products with digital elements, including vulnerabilities of which they become aware and any relevant information provided by third parties”), accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 13(7) asks for documentation in a manner proportionate to the risks; it does not ask for a log of every report with these items. The SHOULD and the items are the Decision. - Applies. Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- Verification. E2 — send test reports through the published channel and compare the log with what the channel received. Checks: SCF-CHK-492.
SCF-VMG-003. Reporter told of every change of status
The producer SHOULD send the reporter a message at each change of status of the report, the last at closure and stating the outcome, until the defect record is closed.
- Rationale. A reporter who hears nothing after the acknowledgement assumes the report was ignored, and may disclose it elsewhere.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1, provision 5.2-1 (a published policy with timelines for “initial acknowledgement of receipt” and “status updates until the resolution of the reported issues”), and the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023, Schedule 1 paragraph 2(2)(b); both accessed 2026-11-21. Both ask the producer to publish when the reporter will receive an acknowledgement and status updates; neither asks for a message at every change of status. The SHOULD is the Decision. - Applies. Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- Verification. E2 — follow a test report through every change of status and read what the reporter was sent. Checks: SCF-CHK-493.
2. Triage — SCF-VMG
SCF-VMG-004. Affected releases from the bills of materials
For each accepted vulnerability in a component, the producer SHOULD determine the affected releases, channels and architectures by querying the bills of materials of every release in support, and record the result in the defect record.
- Rationale. A producer that answers “which of my releases ship this component?” from memory misses a release that ships it, or patches one that does not.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Annex I Part II point (1) (manufacturers “identify and document vulnerabilities and components contained in products with digital elements, including by drawing up a software bill of materials”), accessed 2026-11-21. Point (1) asks to identify and document components and vulnerabilities; it does not ask that the affected releases be found by querying the bills of materials of every release in support. The SHOULD is the Decision. - Applies. Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- Verification. E2 — state a vulnerable range for a component whose version differs between two releases in support and compare the producer’s list with a query of the bills of materials. Checks: SCF-CHK-494.
SCF-VMG-005. Status of a scanner finding, with a justification
The producer SHOULD classify each scanner finding for the delivered configuration with one of the status labels of
SCF-VUL-004 (not_affected, affected, fixed or under_investigation) and give each not_affected a
justification.
- Rationale. A scanner finding dismissed without a reason cannot be reviewed, and the published statement of
SCF-VUL-004has nothing to publish. - Source. OpenVEX specification v0.2.0 (the four status labels; “a VEX statement MUST include either a status
justification or an impact_statement” for
not_affected), accessed 2026-11-21. The specification states this for the statements it defines; it does not ask for it in the producer’s own triage record. The SHOULD is the Decision, owner Product Owner (planproject/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). - Applies. Every producer that triages scanner findings or vulnerability reports.
- Verification. E1 — read the triage record of a sample of scanner findings for a label each and a justification
for every
not_affected. Checks: SCF-CHK-495.
SCF-VMG-006. Severity for the delivered configuration
The producer SHOULD record, for each accepted vulnerability, the rating given by the upstream or the public
vulnerability database, the severity it assigns on its published scale (SCF-ULC-030) and the reason for the
severity chosen.
- Rationale. A score copied from a database says how bad a flaw is in the worst environment; the severity the producer assigns says what it will do in this product, and a reviewer needs both to see the difference.
- Source. FIRST, Common Vulnerability Scoring System v4.0, specification document 1.2 (the Base score “assumes the
reasonable worst-case impact across different deployed environments”; the Environmental metrics “further refine”
it “to a specific computing environment”, and assessing them “is not required, but is highly recommended”),
accessed 2026-11-21. The specification
defines scores and says who assesses which metric group; it does not ask a producer to record a rating, a severity
and a reason together. The SHOULD is the Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). - Applies. Every producer that publishes security advisories.
- Verification. E1 — read the defect record of each security advisory in a sample for the three items. Checks: SCF-CHK-496.
SCF-VMG-007. Releases in support matched against vulnerability data
The producer SHOULD match the bill of materials of every release in support against current vulnerability data on a schedule it states, and record the date, the version of the data and the result of each run.
- Rationale. The release block of
SCF-VUL-003looks at a release once; vulnerabilities are published after the release, so without a recurring match a release in support is silent exactly when it is exposed. - Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with NIST SP 800-218 RV.1.1 (“Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses”, example 1: “Monitor vulnerability databases”), accessed 2026-11-21. RV.1.1 asks to gather such information; it names no schedule and no record of each run. The schedule and the record are the Decision. - Applies. Every producer with a release in support.
- Verification. E2 — read the schedule and the run records, then run the matching on a copy of a bill of materials that holds a component with a published vulnerability. Checks: SCF-CHK-497.
3. Remediation and closure — SCF-VMG
SCF-VMG-008. One recorded outcome for each release
Each accepted vulnerability SHOULD end, for every release in support, in exactly one recorded outcome — fixed,
mitigated, not affected, accepted as residual risk (SCF-VUL-009) or not fixed because the release or the component
is out of support — with a date and the person who decided.
- Rationale. A defect record closed as “done” leaves it unclear which releases received a fix and which were left; each release needs its own answer.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with NIST SP 800-218 RV.2.2 (“Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities”, example 1: a “risk-based decision as to whether each vulnerability will be remediated or if the risk will be addressed through other means (e.g., risk acceptance, risk transference)”), accessed 2026-11-21. RV.2.2 asks for a risk response for each vulnerability; it does not ask for one outcome per release in support, a date and a decider. Those are the Decision. - Applies. Every producer that accepts vulnerability reports.
- Verification. E1 — read a sample of closed defect records against the releases in support at closure. Checks: SCF-CHK-498.
SCF-VMG-009. Fix verified by reproduction before and after
The producer SHOULD verify a fix by reproducing the vulnerability on the build without the fix and then on the build with it, and record both results.
- Rationale. A fix verified only by the absence of a symptom may remove the symptom and leave the vulnerability; a reproduction that fails on the build without the fix shows that the test can fail.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). No source consulted states this method; it is the practice of a regression test that fails before the fix and passes after it. - Applies. Every producer that fixes a vulnerability by a change to code or configuration.
- Verification. E2 — repeat the recorded reproduction on both builds for the last fixes. Checks: SCF-CHK-499.
SCF-VMG-010. Root cause and recurrence recorded
After a fix, the producer SHOULD record the root cause of the vulnerability, the result of a search for the same weakness elsewhere in the system, and the change made to its process or the reason that none is needed.
- Rationale. A vulnerability fixed without asking why it was possible is fixed once, and its siblings wait to be reported.
- Source. NIST SP 800-218 RV.3.1 (“Analyze identified vulnerabilities to determine their root causes”), RV.3.3 (“Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities”) and RV.3.4 (“Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring”), accessed 2026-11-21. The three practices state the three items; the SSDF is a set of recommendations, which is the level taken here.
- Applies. Every producer that fixes an accepted vulnerability.
- Verification. E1 — read the records of the last fixed vulnerabilities for the three items. Checks: SCF-CHK-500.
4. Coordinated disclosure — SCF-VMG
SCF-VMG-011. Contents of the disclosure policy
The disclosure policy (SCF-VUL-007) SHOULD also state its scope (which releases and components), the longest
period for which publication may be deferred at the request of the reporter or an affected party, how reporters are
credited and how the producer treats good-faith research.
- Rationale. A reporter who does not know what is in scope, how long silence can last, whether they will be named and whether testing is welcome will report elsewhere or not at all.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1, provision 5.2-1 (a policy with contact information and timelines), and the Linux kernel documentation, “Security bugs” (“postponed at the request of the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days”); both accessed 2026-11-21. They show items a policy states; neither lists these four. The SHOULD and the four items are the Decision. - Applies. Every producer.
- Verification. E1 — read the published policy for the four items. Checks: SCF-CHK-501.
SCF-VMG-012. Derivatives told before publication
Where other products derive from the product, the producer SHOULD notify the producers of the known derivatives of a vulnerability that is under embargo before it publishes the advisory, through a channel its disclosure policy names.
- Rationale. A derivative that learns of a flaw from the advisory has no time to prepare its own fix; one that is told first can publish its advisory together with the producer’s.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). The Linux kernel documentation, “Security bugs”, section “Coordination with other groups”, accessed 2026-11-21, describes the channels through which one upstream’s fixes reach operating system vendors; it does not ask a producer to notify derivatives. The SHOULD is the Decision. - Applies. Every producer that knows of a derivative of its product.
- Verification. E2 — compare the time of notification of each known derivative with the time of publication for the last embargoed vulnerability, or send a test notice. Checks: SCF-CHK-502.
SCF-VMG-013. A delay in publishing details has a reason and an end date
The producer SHOULD record the reason and the end date of any delay in publishing the details of a fixed vulnerability.
- Rationale. Withholding details until recipients can apply the update is sometimes right; unrecorded, it becomes indefinite concealment.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Annex I Part II point (4) (“in duly justified cases, where manufacturers consider the security risks of publication to outweigh the security benefits, they may delay making public information regarding a fixed vulnerability until after users have been given the possibility to apply the relevant patch”), accessed 2026-11-21. Point (4) allows the delay in justified cases; it does not ask for a recorded reason and end date. The SHOULD is the Decision. - Applies. Every producer that delays the publication of details of a fixed vulnerability.
- Verification. E1 — compare the advisories that say details are withheld with the delay records. Checks: SCF-CHK-503.
5. Reporting duties — SCF-VMG
SCF-VMG-014. Moment of awareness defined and recorded
Each reporting case SHOULD carry the moment at which the producer became aware, established by an event that the reporting procedure defines.
- Rationale. A deadline of hours counts from a moment; where nobody has said what that moment is, it is chosen afterwards, in the producer’s favour.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 14(2) and (4) (each deadline runs from the manufacturer “becoming aware”), accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 14 does not say how awareness is established; defining the event and recording the moment is the Decision. - Applies. Every producer to whom regulation imposes reporting deadlines (
SCF-VUL-006). - Verification. E1 — compare the recorded moment of each case with the earliest log or ticket entry that shows the defining event. Checks: SCF-CHK-504.
SCF-VMG-015. Reportability decided and recorded for each case
For each accepted vulnerability and each security incident, a named role SHOULD record whether a reporting duty applies, on what ground and at what time.
- Rationale. Without the decision record, a notice that was not sent cannot be told from one that was forgotten.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 14(1), (3) and (5) (the triggers: an actively exploited vulnerability; a severe incident, with its criteria), accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 14 defines the triggers; it does not ask for a record of the decision that tests them. The SHOULD is the Decision. - Applies. Every producer to whom regulation imposes reporting deadlines (
SCF-VUL-006). - Verification. E1 — read a sample of case records and every known-exploited vulnerability of the last year for the decision, the ground, the role and the time. Checks: SCF-CHK-505.
SCF-VMG-016. Advisory for an exploited vulnerability without a fix
When a vulnerability in a delivered component is known to be actively exploited and no fix exists, the producer SHOULD publish an advisory that tells recipients what is affected and what they can do, without waiting for the fix.
- Rationale. Recipients who are not told cannot reduce their exposure during the days before a fix, by disabling a feature or restricting a network path.
- Source. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 14(8) (after becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability the
manufacturer informs impacted users “of any risk mitigation and corrective measures that the users can deploy”),
accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 14(8) binds the manufacturers it covers; the SHOULD for every producer, in the form of an
advisory before a fix exists, is the Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). - Applies. Every producer, when a vulnerability in a delivered component is known to be actively exploited and has no fix.
- Verification. E3 — rehearse the case and observe the advisory channel. Checks: SCF-CHK-506.
SCF-VMG-017. Rehearsal at a stated interval and after each change
The reporting capability of SCF-VUL-006 SHOULD be rehearsed at an interval the reporting procedure states, and
again after each change of the reporting endpoint, the duty roster or a template.
- Rationale. A rehearsal shows that the procedure worked on that day; a change of endpoint, roster or template can break it unnoticed.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7).SCF-VUL-006requires a rehearsed procedure and states no interval; no source consulted states one. - Applies. Every producer to whom regulation imposes reporting deadlines (
SCF-VUL-006). - Verification. E1 — compare the date of the last rehearsal with the stated interval and with the latest change. Checks: SCF-CHK-507.
6. Records and measures — SCF-VMG
SCF-VMG-018. Handling records kept as long as the release record
The producer SHOULD retain the records of vulnerability handling — the report log, the defect records, the triage and
reportability decisions, the notices sent and the advisories — for at least as long as it retains the release record
(SCF-EVD-006).
- Rationale. Records kept for less time than the release they concern cannot answer a question about that release when a recipient or an authority asks it.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). Consistent with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Art. 13(7) and (13) (documentation of vulnerabilities; the technical documentation kept “for at least 10 years after the product … has been placed on the market or for the support period, whichever is longer”), accessed 2026-11-21. Art. 13(13) names the technical documentation and the declaration of conformity, not the records of handling; the SHOULD for these records is the Decision. - Applies. Every producer that keeps release records.
- Verification. E2 — retrieve the five kinds of record for the oldest release in support and compare the retention periods. Checks: SCF-CHK-508.
SCF-VMG-019. Handling times computed from the records
For each severity of its scale, the producer SHOULD compute from the records the time from receipt to
acknowledgement, to the triage decision and to the fix, and compare them with the times the scale states
(SCF-ULC-030).
- Rationale. A scale that states times is a promise; only a computation from the records shows whether it is kept.
- Source. Decision, owner Product Owner (plan
project/frameworks/SCF-1.0.md§4.2 wave W7). A computed time is a Measured claim of the knowledge base §4: the method is this computation, the data are the records and the date is the date of the computation. - Applies. Every producer that publishes a severity scale with times.
- Verification. E2 — recompute the times for the vulnerabilities of the last year and compare them with the producer’s computation and the scale. Checks: SCF-CHK-509.
Guidance
Stages and homes
The table says where each stage of the process of SCF-VUL-002 has its obligation, its records and its method. It
adds no rule.
| Stage | Obligation | Records, severity and advisories | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intake | SCF-VUL-001, SCF-VUL-002 |
SCF-ULC-027 to SCF-ULC-029 |
SCF-VMG-001 to SCF-VMG-003 |
| Triage and severity | SCF-VUL-002, SCF-VUL-003, SCF-VUL-004, SCF-VUL-008 |
SCF-ULC-030, SCF-ULC-031 |
SCF-VMG-004 to SCF-VMG-007 |
| Remediation and verification | SCF-VUL-002, SCF-VUL-009, SCF-SRC-007 |
SCF-ULC-027 |
SCF-VMG-008 to SCF-VMG-010 |
| Disclosure and advisories | SCF-VUL-005, SCF-VUL-007 |
SCF-ULC-024 to SCF-ULC-026, SCF-ULC-032 |
SCF-VMG-011 to SCF-VMG-013 |
| Reporting duties | SCF-VUL-006, SCF-LGL-006, SCF-GOV-008 |
none | SCF-VMG-014 to SCF-VMG-017 |
| Records and measures | SCF-EVD-006, SCF-LCM-003 |
SCF-ULC-030 |
SCF-VMG-018, SCF-VMG-019 |
Where the checks are
The baseline checks of Evaluation and conformance section 3 verify the Constitution rules this
method carries out: SCF-CHK-135 and SCF-CHK-136 for the contact, the policy and the process, SCF-CHK-137 for
advisories, SCF-CHK-138 for the reporting capability, SCF-CHK-041 and SCF-CHK-042 for known-exploited
vulnerabilities and exploitability statements, and SCF-CHK-448 and SCF-CHK-476 for residual risk. Each rule of
this part has its own check in the same section of Evaluation, under the heading “Vulnerability management”, named in
its verification field with the evidence level at which it shows the property. Two checks reuse an exercise of the
baseline: the rehearsal of SCF-CHK-138 is the setting of SCF-CHK-506, and the test report of SCF-CHK-136 can
serve SCF-CHK-493.
Regulatory dates
The reporting deadlines, the support-period duties and the retention periods of the regulations that the rules of
this part serve are in References, each with the provision and the date from which it applies.
They are read again before related work and at least annually (SCF-CHG-017). A rule of this part does not change
when a date does.
Sources
- RFC 9116, A File Format to Aid in Security Vulnerability Disclosure (April 2022)
- OpenVEX specification v0.2.0
- FIRST, Common Vulnerability Scoring System v4.0, specification document 1.2
- NIST SP 800-218, Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1 (February 2022)
- ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06), Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements
- The Linux kernel documentation, Security bugs